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The Monetary Policy
Innovation Paradox 




mpirical studies in macroeconomics—
according to Stock and Watson (2001)—
focus on one or more of the following: (i)
describing macroeconomic data, (ii) forecasting
macroeconomic data, (iii) quantifying the sources
of macroeconomic fluctuations, and (iv) providing
analysis of monetary or fiscal policy. Starting with
Sims (1980), the vector autoregression (VAR) has
played an important role in all four of these inter-
related empirical exercises. Assessing policy and
the sources of fluctuations involves careful inter-
pretation of a VAR’s forecast errors. Consequently,
any alteration of the forecasting information set
affects the results of policy analysis to the extent
to which the forecast errors change. The empirical
exercise in this article augments the forecasting
information set and investigates whether the con-
clusions about monetary policy remain the same.
In particular, this article suggests that VAR models
ought to consider, when specifying the forecasting
equations, how monetary policy is implemented
through discrete interest rate changes. I find that
the mis-specification of the data-generating pro-
cess for the federal funds rate significantly affects
inferences regarding policymakers’ behavior in
VAR models.
In this sense, this article is similar to Croushore
and Evans (2000), which compares VAR analyses of
monetary policy using vintage and real-time data
in alternative forecast information sets. Their basic
finding is that the conclusions concerning monetary
policy are quite robust across these two information
sets. Although the change in the forecasting infor-
mation set that I introduce to the VAR is quite modest
in comparison with Croushore and Evans’s (2000)
real-time data, it is sufficient to resolve one nettle-
some puzzle in previous VAR analysis of monetary
policy: how policymakers are thought to proceed
after they introduce a policy “innovation.” The term
policy innovation refers to a surprise change in the
federal funds rate that is not part of a systematic
response—as implied by the VAR coefficients—to
the state of the economy. For some sample periods
and methods of decomposing forecast errors into
separate shocks—enough cases to constitute a
pattern—monetary policy shocks derived from VARs
suggest that policymakers respond to a policy inno-
vation by following it with additional policy moves
in the same direction.
It is natural to ask why policymakers would
systematically react to their own unexpected—and
perhaps uncalled for—increase in the federal funds
rate with further increases.1 We can call this puzzling
pattern the “policy innovation paradox.” Specifi-
cally, the policy innovation paradox appears in the
impulse response function of the federal funds rate
to a shock to itself. Under the usual assumption
that the federal funds rate is set by monetary policy-
makers, this impulse response function shows the
typical response of monetary policymakers to a
shock that they themselves induced. The policy
innovation paradox appears when this impulse
response continues upward for one or more periods
after the initial shock before decaying toward zero.
If this characterization of policymaker behavior is
accurate, it raises a question: What good does it do
for policymakers to systematically follow a surprise
increase in the federal funds rate with additional
increases? These additional increases would not
have a surprise element, nor would they be part of
a response to other developments in the economy.
The policy innovation paradox would amount to
an odd custom of monetary policymakers piling
additional funds rate increases on top of a surprise
increase.
One rather intricate explanation for this seem-
ingly counterintuitive behavior is that policymakers
have access to forecasts that are superior to VAR
forecasts. It is possible that the VAR model does not
characterize enough policy actions as being system-
atic responses to developments in the economy.
What the model calls a policy innovation may actu-
ally be a systematic policy response to an inflation
threat that VAR forecasts fail to detect. If such an
inflation threat only gradually recedes, policymakers
1 Note that when one traces the effect of a monetary policy shock for
many periods—48, for example—visual evidence of this phenomenon
in the first three or so periods may be difficult to detect in a chart.
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© 2002, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.might undertake a series of tightening moves to
counter it. In the case where the inflation threat
goes undetected by the VAR forecasts, the series of
tightening policy moves are attributed to an initial
policy innovation that is compounded with addi-
tional policy moves in the same direction as the
innovation. One glaring weakness with this explana-
tion is that the VAR would have to make systematic
forecast errors to miss such an inflation threat repeat-
edly. For this reason, I investigate an alternative
explanation in this article. 
The idea that policymakers have information
beyond what is contained in VAR forecasts also
appears in explanations of the “price puzzle.” This
puzzle arises when an identified VAR suggests that
an unexpected tightening of monetary policy leads
to an increase in the price level. Many VARs that
decompose forecast errors and derive a monetary
policy shock exhibit a price puzzle. The generally
accepted explanation for the price puzzle is that
monetary policymakers can foresee a rise in infla-
tion, causing them to raise interest rates preemp-
tively. When the VAR forecasts fail to predict this
rise in inflation, however, the increase in interest
rates is attributed to a monetary policy shock. A
misleading inference from a VAR that suffers from
the price puzzle is that surprise monetary policy
tightenings cause inflation to rise. One way to “fix”
the price puzzle in such VARs is to add commodity
prices to the model. Changes in commodity prices
can aid in forecasting changes in the price level that
are due to supply shocks, although the relationship
between commodity prices and the price level is
somewhat loose (Boughton and Branson, 1991).
This resolution of the price puzzle is similar to my
proposed resolution of the monetary policy innova-
tion puzzle: both claim that crucial information is
missing from the forecast information set in VARs
that exhibit the puzzle.
The purpose of this article is to suggest that
the policy innovation paradox described above is
an artifact of not taking into account the discreteness
of monetary policy changes when forecasting. I
show that a simple adjustment to the VAR forecast-
ing procedure makes the policy paradox disappear.
That is, a policy innovation is not usually followed
by further policy moves in the same direction.
Instead, the policy shock immediately begins to
decay toward zero. The starting point for my expla-
nation of the policy innovation paradox is that VARs
generally use monthly or quarterly averages of the
daily effective federal funds rate as a measure of
monetary policy actions (Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans, 1999, and the references therein). The
averaging of daily rates smooths and tends to cancel
idiosyncratic fluctuations in daily rates that have
nothing to do with monetary policy. In this article,
I examine one simple but overlooked aspect of
using a monthly or quarterly average of the daily
federal funds rate in VARs: Since 1984, the Federal
Reserve consistently has adjusted a target level for
the federal funds rate by discrete increments. Such
discrete adjustments to the target during a month
convey information about how the next month’s
average of daily rates is expected to differ from this
month’s average.
It is important to consider how knowledge of a
discrete target change contributes to forecasting.
Consider two hypothetical target changes: in the
first, the target is raised by 25 basis points one-third
of the way through a month; in the second, the
target is raised by 50 basis points two-thirds of the
way through a month. In the current month, the
monthly average of the daily rates would be the
same either way, other things equal. Thus, if one
were to forecast the next month’s average based
solely on current and past values of monthly aver-
ages, the forecast for the next month would be iden-
tical in both of these cases. Discrete target changes
usually persist, however, so knowledge of a target
change of 50 versus 25 basis points would affect
one’s forecast of the average level in the next month.
Nevertheless, VARs that include monthly or quarterly
averages of the daily effective federal funds rate
have ignored information contained in discrete
target changes. This article investigates whether
including information from discrete target changes
in VAR forecasts materially changes inferences about
how policymakers proceed after they introduce a
monetary policy innovation.
DISCRETE TARGET CHANGES AND
FORECASTS OF THE MONTHLY 
AVERAGE
If a month has N business days and a 50-basis-
point (bp) increase in the target federal funds rate
occurs Ni business days into the month, then, other
things equal, we would raise our forecast of the
next monthly average, FF —–
t+1, by Ni/N ×50 bp above
this month’s average, FF —–
t. If more than one discrete
change takes place within a month, then we would
alter the forecast by
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where the discrete target changes are denoted ∆FF
T.
We can include Zt–1, the information imparted by
discrete target changes during month t–1, as an
exogenous regressor that helps forecast the depen-
dent variables in month t. A key hypothesis is that
the coefficient on Zt–1 in the federal funds rate equa-
tion is equal to one. This value would confirm the
belief that the expected value of FF —–
t rises one to one
with Zt–1, and it would indicate that the forecast
errors in the VAR depend significantly on informa-
tion regarding discrete changes in the target federal
funds rate.
A BENCHMARK VAR WITH AND
WITHOUT ADJUSTMENT FOR 
DISCRETENESS
Monthly data since 1984 offer a relatively short
sample for a VAR, but this period provides the longest
uninterrupted time series on discrete changes to
the target federal funds rate (Rudebusch, 1995).
The specific sample period is January 1984 to June
2001. To illustrate the puzzle in an uncluttered
model, I use Stock and Watson’s (2001) benchmark
three-variable VAR in levels. They decompose fore-
cast errors into separate orthogonal shocks through
a recursive scheme that puts the inflation rate first,
followed by the unemployment rate and the average
of the daily federal funds rates, with all three of
these variables in levels. Specific data definitions
are given in Table 1. Twelve lags of all variables are
included to purge the residuals of serial correlation
at the seasonal frequencies.
As an exogenous variable, we add Zt–1 (with
no additional lags) to the VAR to include informa-
tion from discrete target changes. Table 2 reports
the coefficients on this discreteness variable. As
expected, the coefficient on Zt–1 in the federal funds
rate equation (1.21) is not significantly different from
one (and very significantly different from zero). Here
a value of one means that a discrete target change
Ζ =× ∑NN F F i
i
ti
T ∆ , ,
is expected to raise next month’s average of daily
rates by the full amount of the discrete change.
Although the point estimate of 1.21 is not signifi-
cantly different from one, an estimate above one
might make sense in that target changes tend to be
positively correlated across time. Thus, forecasters
might anticipate that a discrete change in a given
month will be followed by an additional discrete
change in the same direction in the next month.
Table 2 shows that the discreteness variable, Zt–1,
is not a significant predictor of either inflation or
unemployment, nor is there any reason to expect
a direct relationship. In this case, the discreteness
adjustment affects only inflation and unemployment
through its effect on forecasts of the federal funds
rate. Without the exogenous variable, the standard
error of the regression in the federal funds rate equa-
tion is 0.229, whereas it drops to 0.192 (about 16
percent lower) when the exogenous variable is
included. Tables 3 and 4 give more complete results
on the coefficient estimates in the VAR.
One key difference between the two VARs
appears in the first two lags of the federal funds rate
in the federal funds rate equation. (The other lag
coefficients are all small in absolute value and their
sum is small, as shown in Tables 3 and 4.) In the
model without Z the first two lag coefficients are
1.237 and –0.245; the same coefficients equal 0.924
and 0.026 when Z is included. The presence of Z
appears to remove the overshooting and oscillatory
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VAR Data Definitions
Inflation Monthly chain-type price index, personal consumption expenditures (monthly percent 
change, not annualized)
Unemployment Percent unemployment in civilian labor force, over age 16
Interest rate Monthly average of daily effective federal funds rate
Table 1




Federal funds 1.21 (0.141)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 2dynamics in the federal funds rate that appear in the
VAR without Z. In both VAR systems, the largest auto-
regressive root is over 0.99. The difference is in the
oscillatory dynamics, not in the size of the largest
root. The overshooting and oscillatory dynamics in
the VAR without the discreteness adjustment ought
to appear as a hump shape in the impulse response
of the federal funds rate to its own shock.
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Coefficients for VAR without Discreteness Adjustment
Coefficient Inflation equation Unemployment equation Federal funds equation
Inflationt–1 0.196 (0.074) –0.055 (0.072) 0.097 (0.123)
Inflationt–2 –0.094 (0.076) 0.112 (0.074) 0.071 (0.126)
Inflationt–i –0.455 0.163 0.831
(sum of lag coefficients)
Unemploymentt–1 –0.014 (0.080) 0.746 (0.077) –0.250 (0.132)
Unemploymentt–2 –0.112 (0.098) 0.158 (0.094) –0.112 (0.162)
Unemploymentt–i 0.124 0.075 0.309
(sum of lag coefficients)
Federal fundst–1 0.160 (0.047) –0.043 (0.046) 1.24 (0.078)
Federal fundst–2 –0.213 (0.075) 0.062 (0.072) –0.245 (0.124)
Federal fundst–i 0.071 –0.007 –0.041
(sum of lag coefficients)








Coefficients for VAR with Discreteness Adjustment
Coefficient Inflation equation Unemployment equation Federal funds equation
Inflationt–1 0.194 (0.075) –0.059 (0.072) 0.124 (0.104)
Inflationt–2 –0.090 (0.077) 0.124 (0.074) –0.014 (0.106)
Inflationt–i 0.473 0.217 0.433
(sum of lag coefficients)
Unemploymentt–1 –0.016 (0.080) 0.738 (0.077) –0.188 (0.111)
Unemploymentt–2 –0.112 (0.098) 0.156 (0.094) –0.094 (0.136)
Unemploymentt–i 0.127 0.084 0.242
(sum of lag coefficients)
Federal fundst–1 0.174 (0.054) –0.006 (0.052) 0.924 (0.075)
Federal fundst–2 –0.225 (0.078) 0.024 (0.075) 0.026 (0.109)
Federal fundst–i 0.067 –0.016 0.020
(sum of lag coefficients)
Discreteness adjustment Zt–1 –0.054 (0.102) –0.167 (0.098) 1.21 (0.141) 







Table 4Comparison of Impulse Responses
The impulse response of the federal funds rate
to its own shock shows what monetary policymakers
tend to do following a surprise increase in the federal
funds rate that is not part of a systematic response
to an inflation or unemployment shock—i.e., a
policy innovation. Without the exogenous variable
in the VAR, the impulse response of the federal funds
rate to its own shock displays the policy innovation
paradox. The upper right panel of Figure 1 shows
that, according to this VAR specification, the mone-
tary policy response to a surprise increase in the
federal funds rate is to increase it even more during
the next two months. According to this impulse
response, the funds rate remains above the initial
shock level until five months after the policy inno-
vation. Such a path for the funds rate would be very
difficult to rationalize as a typical monetary policy
response. In fact, some VARs identify monetary
policy shocks with the assumption that a sensible
monetary policy response to a policy innovation or
nonsystematic change in the policy instrument is to
undo the change relatively quickly (Klaeffling, 2001).
An alternative interpretation of this impulse
response, however, is that the continued upward
movement of the federal funds rate after the initial
shock is an artifact of taking monthly averages of a
rate that undergoes discrete shifts within the month.
The intuition is that monthly averaging breaks a
discrete target change into two pieces: a discrete
increase in the target rate in the middle of this month
will raise this month’s average of daily rates by half
of the size of the target change; the other half will
appear as an increase in next month’s average over
this month’s average. The key is to forecast the next
month’s average funds rate in a way that uses infor-
mation from this month’s discrete target change—
which is precisely what the exogenous variable Z is
designed to do.
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Responses of Inflation, Unemployment, and Federal Funds Rate to a Federal Funds Rate Shock
With Discreteness Adjustment
Response of Inflation Response of Unemployment Response of Federal Funds Rate
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Figure 1The lower right panel of Figure 1 shows the
impulse response of the federal funds rate to its own
shock when the exogenous variable Z is included
in the system. According to this chart, the response
of monetary policymakers to a policy innovation
or nonsystematic increase in the federal funds rate
is to undo it in a gradual, monotonic fashion. As a
description of policymaker behavior, this monotoni-
cally declining impulse response is much easier to
rationalize than a hump-shaped response that rises
further before declining. 
Figure 1 also shows the impulse responses of
inflation and unemployment to monetary policy
shocks. As one might expect, these responses do
not differ in any significant manner across the two
VAR specifications—with or without the discrete-
ness variable Z. We would expect this result given
that Z has very low correlations with inflation and
unemployment, so that the VAR coefficients are
little changed in the presence of Z. Therefore, the
discreteness adjustment variable in the VAR has
little effect on the cumulative impulse response of
inflation and unemployment to a federal funds rate
shock. Thus, previous VAR analysis of the effects
of monetary policy shocks on the economy is left
essentially unchanged with this alteration to the
VAR model.
Comparison of Variance Decompositions
While the impulse responses—the response
of inflation and unemployment to a given shock—
do not differ across the two VAR specifications, the










NOTE: Dashed and solid lines represent variance decomposition with and without discreteness adjustments, respectively.
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Figure 2ness adjustment variable Z is designed to help pre-
dict the federal funds rate, so its presence might
alter inferences regarding the relative frequency
of different types of shocks. Figure 2 shows the
variance decompositions from the two VAR models.
The only notable differences are the variances
attributable to inflation shocks. With Z, a higher
proportion of the variance in unemployment is due
to inflation shocks, and a lower proportion of the
variance in the federal funds rate is due to inflation.
But these differences do not affect qualitative
descriptions of which shock accounts for most of
the variance in a given variable.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
This article considers a straightforward way to
make use of information contained in discrete
changes to the target federal funds rate when fore-
casting. The purpose is to show that discreteness is
an important feature of the data-generating process
for the federal funds rate and that failure to address
discreteness affects inferences regarding monetary
policymakers’ behavior. I apply the approach to a
simple three-variable VAR and, not surprisingly, the
additional exogenous variable is only a significant
predictor of the monthly federal funds rate, not
inflation or unemployment. In addition, the discrete-
ness adjustment variable has a coefficient that is
not significantly different from one in the federal
funds rate equation. We would expect a coefficient
of one because the value of this variable is equal to
the effect that a discrete target change implies for
the change in the daily average from one month to
the next, depending on when the change occurs
during the month.
This discreteness adjustment nonetheless pro-
vides a simple, new explanation for what I call the
policy innovation paradox—whereby the reaction
of monetary policymakers to their own policy inno-
vation is to push the federal funds rate even farther
in the same direction as the initial surprise move.
This article shows that the policy innovation para-
dox disappears once we make use of the discrete-
ness information when forecasting the federal
funds rate. Thus, the paradox is simply an artifact
of using the monthly average of the daily federal
funds rate and failing to take account of the informa-
tion from discrete target changes when forecasting
the monthly funds rate. This resolution of the policy
innovation paradox does not affect previous VAR
results concerning the effects of monetary policy
shocks on other macroeconomic quantities—
namely, inflation and unemployment.
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